This paper develops a hierarchical principal-agent model to explore the influence of corruption, bribery, and politically provided oversight of production on the efficiency and level of output of some publicly provided good. Under full information, an honest politician acheives the first best while a dishonest politician creates shortages and bribes. Under asymmetric information, however, an honest politician might create more shortages relative to a dishonest one, although, the latter creates greater bribes. Furthermore, the contracted output can be greater or smaller 
1. Introduction
Scarcity rents and shortages
The combination of a monopolist, and corrupt, public-agent is often cited as the reason for the existence of scarcity rents and shortages of public output in the literature; for instance Aidt (2003) and Bardhan (1997) . Private individuals often require the consent of a monopolist public-agent to engage in some intermediate or final economic activity, the actual demand for which often exceeds its supply. The public-agent then charges a price in excess of the official price (scarcity rent per unit), to clear the market. Scarcity rents are extensively documented for a wide range of activities such as industrial licenses, export-import licenses, public housing, irrigation water, passports, driving licenses, public credit, exchange rates and old age pensions, in developed and developing countries 2 .
There are two main competing explanations of shortages and scarcity rents. In queuing models, for example Lui (1985) , waiting in a queue for a public output is costly. The objective is to find the Nash equilibrium in bribing strategies for individuals who can pay bribes, in order to jump the queue. However, the results are very sensitive to the different methods of organizing the queue and are not robust to plausible extensions; see for example Bardhan (1997) .
In the other explanation, due to Shleifer and Vishny (1993) , the government has full information on the cost/ demand conditions facing a monopolist public-agent who provides a non-contractible public output. Hence, the public-agent sells the monopoly output and collects a scarcity rent equal to the monopoly profit. However, under full information, the monopoly profits are public information, so charging the public-agent a transfer/ franchise fee equal to the monopoly profit, at all output levels, ensures the first best, removal of corruption and an improvement in welfare. Corruption would then be non-distortionary, a prediction rejected by the empirical evidence; for example Mauro (1995) .
One of the aims of this paper is to provide an extension of the basic Shleifer-Vishny model that enables an equilibrium with shortages and scarcity rents to be supported.
Basic building blocks of the model 1.2.1. The public-agent is better informed about costs
The notion that the government has access to information on all relevant aspects of the operation of a public-agent is quite strong; see for example, Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) . Public-agents are likely to have superior information on, for instance, the physical and 2 See Rose-Ackerman (1999: Chapter 2) and UNDP (1997) for examples from Russia/ E. Europe, United States, Hong-Kong, Phillipines and Pakistan. Also see Bardhan (1984) for the much-maligned 'LicenseRaj' in India and Mbaku (2000) for a range of examples from the African continent, but especially Nigeria and Ghana. Levine and Satarov (2000) illustrate the experience of transition economies, especially Russia, with respect to scarcity rents. Other specific instances of this form of corruption can be found in Krueger (1974) , Vishny (1992, 1993) , Tanzi (1998) and Coolidge and Rose-Ackerman (1997).
managerial technology used for producing the public output or indeed on their competence in using it. Insofar as these factors impinge mainly on costs, we assume that the publicagent has private information on costs. There are two types of public-agents, a low-cost type, c L , and a high-cost type, c H .
The costs in the model can be interpreted either as production or provision costs. In one possible interpretation, the public-agent engages directly in the production of the public output. However, in several examples of scarcity rents cited above, the publicagent engages in provision of the public output. Provision costs can of course be high, for instance, in the provision of scarce housing when expensive 'means testing' needs to be done. Or in the provision of industrial licenses where detailed feasibility studies and compliance criteria need to be checked.
Provision costs can also be small (relative to the costs of production which are sunk), nevertheless it is on the basis of the provision costs that the public-agent takes his decision. Essentially, the marginal costs, not the fixed costs, condition the corruption decision of the public-agent. Hence, inefficiencies or distortions might arise on account of these 'small' costs of provision. Furthermore, our results do not crucially hinge on the magnitude of the costs c L and c H ; the important condition is c H > c L .
Costs of provision among public-agents can differ for several reasons. For instance, the public-agent can be particularly inefficient in processing the available information, or might lack in experience and insist on undertaking detailed means testing, feasibility studies and checking in minute detail all compliance criteria so that the costs in terms of resources or time foregone are very high. Also, a particularly conscientious public-agent could have high costs for similar reasons. Since 'competence' and 'conscience' are deep personal characteristics, cost becomes private information for the public-agent. We use the efficient/ inefficient terminology to refer to types c L and c H respectively.
Public output is often observable and verifiable
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) assume that the government cannot contract on the quantity sold by the public-agent. However, in the current context, the converse assumption is often more realistic for the following reasons. First, for many types of outputs supplied by public-agents, the transaction must be officially recorded to be of any use to the consumer. Thus, for instance, public housing is of limited use if it is not officially issued; the same also applies to a passport, and several forms of industrial and export-import licenses. Once officially recorded, the output sold by the public-agent is fully observed by the government and can be contracted upon; indeed, it is common practice for governments to set quantity targets for public-agents in both developed and developing countries 3 . Second, although the government often mandates the price at which the public-agent is required to sell its output 4 , it typically does not observe the actual price charged by the public-agent when the latter is dishonest. Indeed, the evidence suggests that when public output is scarce, public-agents often resort to scarcity rents in order to clear the market.
Dynamic considerations
In mechanism design games of the sort considered in this paper, where the government tries to elicit the public-agent's hidden information by a choice of contracted output, a dynamic setting raises issues of renegotiation. Once the type of the public-agent is revealed, then the government can implement the first best contracts in subsequent periods. Anticipating such action in the future, the public-agent might not be willing to reveal hidden information, or might require additional information rents to do so. However, this distorts the contracts predicted by the static game.
Other features of the model
The politician reimburses the public-agent's cost using non-distortionary taxation, instructs the latter to sell at some official price and contracts on its output. The publicagent engages in bribery by selling at a price above the official price 5 . An exogenously given auditing technology allows the politician to discover hard evidence of such bribery with some probability ρ > 0. However, in return for a share in the bribe, certain kinds of politicians, the venal ones, are willing to hide evidence of the bribe. Decent politicians, on the other hand, eschew such corrupt side transactions. The 'degree of venality' of the politician is a parameter of her preferences. We characterize and analyze the comparative static properties of contracted output and bribes under these conditions.
Results
Under full information, shortages and corruption occur only if the politician is venal. Decent politicians, by virtue of their ability to contract on output, produce the first best outcome. This is in contrast to Shleifer and Vishny (1993) where bribery can occur even when the politician is decent because the latter cannot contract on output. Furthermore, under full information, the contracted output always exceeds that produced by a private unregulated monopolist. Under asymmetric information, each type of politician creates shortages in order to limit information rents. Whilst limiting information rents is the primary focus of a decent politician, however, a venal politician, in addition, also cares about the bribes that he gets. For this reason, a venal politician creates further distortions in contracted output (in addition to those that arise from the desire to limit information rents). The direction of these distortions depends on the relation of the contracted output to that produced by a private unregulated monopolist. Because the direction of these distortions depends on the parameters, the asymmetric information case gives new insights relative to the full information case. Furthermore, it helps to reconcile apparently conflicting results on the effects of corruption on the size of the public sector.
An improvement in the auditing technology lowers the private marginal cost of a unit of bribes to the dishonest politician and increases her bargaining power. The dishonest politician then distorts output in the direction of increasing bribes. However, the distortion of output can, depending on the parameter values, be efficiency enhancing or efficiency reducing. In the former case, it creates tradeoffs, in welfare terms, between the bribe increasing (cost) and the efficiency enhancing (benefit) aspect of changes in the monitoring technology.
The analysis of the dynamic game follows Hart and Tirole (1988) and Laffont and Tirole (1993) . Relative to the static case, in the dynamic renegotiation-proof equilibrium, shortages fall but bribes can either increase or decrease. This suggests important determinants of the choice between offering short-term and long-term contracts to public-agents. The type of equilibrium expected to prevail in the dynamic game, namely, hybrid, fully separating or fully pooling, depends on the time discount factor of the public-agent.
Schematic outline
The schematic outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the static model and Section 3 solves it in the benchmark case of full information. Section 4 derives the solution to the static model under asymmetric information. Section 5 analyzes the problem in its dynamic version, in the presence of renegotiation. Finally, some conclusions are presented in Section 6. All proofs are collected in the appendix.
The Model
An upper-tier of the government, referred to by the generic term, politician, contracts a monopolist lower-tier of the government, referred to by the generic name, public-agent, to supply some good or service, on its behalf, to final consumers. The publicly known inverse demand curve facing the public-agent is given by p (q) where p is the price, and q is the demand. The demand curve is downward sloping i.e. p 0 < 0. The cost curve of the public-agent is given by C (q) = cq, where c > 0 is the constant marginal cost. The marginal cost c is privately known to the public-agent and is referred to as her 'type'. The type space is given by the discrete set Θ = {c H , c L } where c H > c L and the subscripts 'H' and 'L' have the connotation of 'high' and 'low' cost respectively. We shall denote by ∆c, the cost difference c H − c L . The prior belief that the type is efficient, i.e. c = c L , is given by ν ∈ [0, 1].
All players, the consumers, politician and the public agent, are risk neutral. The politician levies non-distortionary taxes on the consumers to finance the payment of a lumpsum transfer 't' and the cost of provision C (q) to the public-agent. The politician announces the type contingent contracts (t L , q L , c L ), (t H , q H , c H ) respectively for the efficient and the inefficient types of the public-agent. Each of these contracts specifies a triple: a transfer t i , a quantity q i and an official per unit price c i 6 ; i = H, L.
Bribes
If a type-c j public-agent (j = i or j 6 = i) accepts the contract (t i , q i , c i ), the bribe to the public-agent j is
Note that the bribe received by type-c j depends on the contracted output, q i , the consumer's willingness to pay, p(q i ), and the official price, c i . In particular, the bribe does not depend on the unit cost, c j , of agent j. Sometimes we will simply use the abbreviated notation B i (q i ) for B i (t i , q i , c i ). Figure 2 .1 shows a situation in which the efficient type, type c L , accepts the contract designed for type c H .
The efficient type is then faced with an official price per unit, c H , but the consumers' willingness to pay per unit is p H and so type c L receives a bribe B H = q H (p H − c H ) (which is independent of c L ). Furthermore, by mis-stating costs type c L derives an extra payoff equal to ∆cq H because her per unit costs are c L but she is reimbursed at the rate of c H per unit by the politician. 
Sequence of moves in the static game
The sequence of moves in the static game (the dynamic game is considered in Section 5) is as follows. The politician announces the type contingent
The public-agent accepts or rejects the contracts. If the contracts are accepted, the publicagent decides whether to receive bribes from consumers. Then the politician discovers hard evidence of bribes with probability ρ > 0. With probability 1 − ρ, the public-agent gets to keep the bribe. There are no penalties over and above the confiscation of the bribe. Such penalties do not qualitatively alter the results as long as they are not prohibitive in the sense that they completely eliminate the incentive for bribery. This conforms to If hard evidence is discovered, then the politician might (depending on the degree of venality) offer to suppress the evidence if the public-agent agrees to share the bribe; such sharing uses the Nash Bargaining solution. If the public-agent refuses to share the bribe, then the bribe is confiscated and returned back to the consumers. If the public-agent agrees to share the bribe then the game ends with the division of the bribe and no bribes are returned back to consumers. The solution is derived by backward induction.
Audits and information revelation
In our model, a successful audit merely reveals that a bribe has been paid (and its magnitude). In particular, even a successful audit does not reveal any new information about the cost parameter c i . From (2.1) it is immediately apparent that bribes only depend on the type of the contract accepted by the public agent and not on the public-agent's type. We explain this more fully below.
In a fully separating equilibrium, type i (with marginal cost c i ) chooses contract (t i , q i , c i ) and hence, obviously, reveals the type through her choice of contract 7 .
At the other extreme, in a fully pooling equilibrium, where, say, both types c L and c H choose contract (t H , q H , c H ), auditing does not reveal any information about costs. The audit merely reveals, with probability ρ, that a bribe q H [p (q H ) − c H ] has been paid. This gives no new information about the true value of c i .
In a hybrid equilibrium where, say, type c H chooses contract (t H , q H , c H ) with certainty and type c L chooses (t L , q L , c L ) with probability π > 0, the politician updates her belief,
But this is already known from the fact that the agent has accepted the contract
In an extended model we could allow 'cost auditing' as well as 'honesty auditing'. But this lies beyond the scope of this paper.
Preferences of the Public-Agent
The expected utility of the public-agent of type c j who accepts the contract
where t i is the transfer received from the politician E £ B
A i
¤ is the expected bribe received and the term (c i − c j ) q i arises because a type j has unit cost c j but is reimbursed c i by accepting the contract (t i , q i , c i ) (see Figure 2 .1). The expectation operator E runs over the 'state of the world'-absence or presence of hard evidence of bribes and the type of the politician-venal or decent (these terms are formally defined below). The public-agent's reservation utility is normalized to zero.
Preferences of Consumers
The expected utility of a representative consumer is defined as 7 Once the choice of contracts reveals the type of the public-agent, why does not the politician tear up the origial contract and offer the full information contracts? There are two reasons why this does not happen. First, the ability of the government to commit not to renegotiate its contracts underpins a large literature that uses mechanism design in the presence of asymmetric information. We find this to be a fairly plausible restriction given issues of reputation etc. Second, renegotiation might actually not be possible in several kinds of static games when previous events are irreversible; see for instance Laffont and Tirole (1993) . Renegotiation is explicitly considered below in a dynamic version of the game.
where S (q i ) = R q i 0 p (q) dq is the 'gross consumer surplus'. Consumers pay taxes of an amount t i + c i q i to finance the operation of the public-agent and bribes equal to B i to gain access to the (possibly scarce) public output. In the event that hard evidence of bribes is discovered by the politician and if the bribe is confiscated (which is an endogenous decision), it is returned back to consumers as a lumpsum transfer; E £ B
C i
¤ is the expected receipt of such bribes by the consumers from the politician when a public agent chooses contract (t i , q i , c i ).
Preferences of the Politician
The objective function of the politician is given by
where U is the utility of consumers (a measure of social welfare) and E £ B
P i
¤ is the expected bribe received by the politician from the public-agent when the latter chooses contract (t i , q i , c i ). The parameter µ ∈ [0, ∞) is the weight placed by the politician on personal gratification relative to social welfare; it reflects the "degree of the politician's venality".
Definition 1 : A "venal" politician cares relatively more for personal benefits i.e. µ > 1 while a "decent" politician cares relatively more for social welfare i.e. µ ≤ 1. The "degree of venality" is given by the size of µ.
The Nash Bargaining Solution
Suppose that the politician discovers hard evidence of bribes after the public agent chooses contract (t i , q i , c i ). Let x ∈ [0, B i ] be the politician's share of the bribe. If the politician and the public agent reach an agreement on sharing the bribe, their respective payoffs are
However, should the politician and the public-agent not be able to reach an agreement, their respective disagreement payoffs, d
P and d A , are
, which is positive only when the politician is venal i.e. µ > 1. The Nash Bargaining solution, x i , is found by maximizing the product
It is straightforward to check that the solution, x i , is given by
and the public-agent's share B i − x i equals
Lemma 1 : In the event that hard evidence of bribes is found, a decent politician (µ ≤ 1) returns all bribes to the consumers, while a venal politician (µ > 1) conceals the evidence for a share in the bribe. Furthermore, the politician's share of the bribe is decreasing in the degree of venality, µ, with x N → B i as µ → 1 and
In Lemma 1 the decent politician's decision to eschew a corrupt deal with the publicagent is an endogenous one. It is harder to bribe a less venal politician, hence, the politician's share of bribes is decreasing in the degree of venality.
The Public-agent's Bribery Decision
When the politician is decent (µ ≤ 1), she confiscates the public-agent's bribe. In this case the public agent's expected bribe,
When the politician is venal (µ > 1), given (2.6), the expected bribe of a public-agent, who accepts the contract
Definition 2 : From (2.7) and (2.8), the generic expression for the public-agent's expected bribe, when she accepts the contract
From Definition 2, Φ (µ, ρ) ≥ 0, hence, in the absence of any additional penalties above the confiscation of the bribe, the public-agent always accepts bribes 8 .
The Full Information equilibrium
Under full information, the public-agent cannot misrepresent her type. Denote the equilibrium contract for a public-agent of type c i under full information by ¡ t j * i , q j * i , c i ¢ where j = D, V indexes the type of the politician; decent and venal respectively and i = H, L refers to the public-agent's type.
The Generic Problem
The generic problem facing the politician is
Subject to :
The feasibility constraint ensures that the public-agent does not make any per-unit losses, it is omitted for the time being but the solution is subsequently checked against it. The individual rationality constraint, which ensures that the public-agent receives at least the reservation utility, binds under full information, because rents to the public-agent must be given by sacrificing valuable consumer welfare, hence,
Notice that the term (c i − c j ) q i does not appear in the individual rationality constraint because types cannot be misrepresented under full information.
Decent Politician (µ ≤ 1)
With probability ρ the politician discovers hard evidence of the bribe and returns the bribe to the consumers so E £ B
), hence, the generic problem in subsection 3.1 reduces to the following unconstrained problem.
The first order condition gives
It is obvious that the solution is first best, q
, and the feasibility constraint is satisfied. The intuition is that with probability ρ the bribe gets confiscated and returned back to consumers while with probability 1 − ρ, transfers to the public-agent are reduced by the amount of the bribe so net bribes paid equal
The result is recorded without proof in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 : The corruptibility of the public-agent is irrelevant under the regime of a decent politician and the outcome is first best.
Proposition 1 shows that relative to the corruptibility of a public-agent, the corruptibility of the politician is of first order importance. Under full information, bribery never occurs if the politician is decent. This contrasts with Shleifer and Vishny (1993) where bribery can occur even when the politician is decent, because output is not contractible.
Venal Politician (µ > 1)
The venal politician never returns any bribes to the consumers so E £ B C i ¤ = 0. Since hard evidence of bribes is found only with probability ρ so E £ B (2.8) . Hence, the generic problem in section 3.1 can be written as the following unconstrained problem:
where ξ, the venal politician's private marginal cost of a unit of bribes is
ξ is decreasing in µ and ρ. The first order condition to the problem is
while the second order condition is
which holds if
in (3.5) one obtains:
Proposition 2 : The contracted output is intermediate between the first best and the monopoly level i.e. q
i = H, L and there are positive bribes in equilibrium,
The contracted output is decreasing and bribes are increasing in (1) the politician's degree of venality, µ, and (2) efficiency of the monitoring technology, ρ.
Proposition 2 shows that corruption takes the form of shortages of public output relative to the first best, however, the contracted output exceeds that produced by a private unregulated monopolist. Some well known examples of shortages include the former Soviet Union (Shleifer and Vishny (1992) ), the recent experience of transition economies (Levine and Satarov (2000) , UNDP (1997)), and the "License Raj" in India (Bardhan (1984) ).
More venal politicians (high µ) contract lower output because that is the direction of increasing bribes when q
(see Remark 1), hence, shortages worsen under their regime. This result can change under asymmetric information, as will be shown in section 4 below. A more efficient auditing technology (high ρ) decreases ξ, the venal politician's private marginal cost of a unit of bribes, hence, creating greater shortages and bribes.
Under full information, transfers are negative in the regime of a venal politician because t i = −Φ (µ, ρ) B i ≤ 0. One interpretation of negative transfers is the sale of public offices, for instance, 'tax farming'. Another interpretation is more natural in corrupt regimes, competition for government jobs by paying up-front bribes (negative transfers) is pervasive in several countries; see for instance Krueger (1974) and Shleifer and Vishny (1993).
Equilibrium Under Asymmetric Information
The full information allocation is not incentive compatible under asymmetric information. Denote the contracts designed for the efficient and the inefficient types respectively by (q L , t L ) and (q H , t H ) 9 . Dropping superscripts, the efficient type's expected payoff from accepting her full information contract is EV L (q L , t L ) = 0, but, under asymmetric information on the public-agent's type, by accepting the inefficient type's contract, its expected payoff is
Hence, the efficient type has an incentive to misrepresent her type.
The Generic Problem
The politician chooses type contingent contracts to maximize expected welfare Z j , where
subject to the following four constraints
where W j is defined in (3.1). 
Substituting t H into the binding IC L constraint, the latter can be rewritten as
Definition 3 : The information rent of the efficient public-agent, type-c L , equals q H ∆c > 0.
Furthermore, by adding the two IC constraints one gets ∆c (q L − q H ) ≥ 0 which implies that q L ≥ q H i.e. incentive compatibility requires that the contracted output of the efficient type is higher. Substituting t H and t L from (4.2) and (4.3) into the objective function, one derives the unconstrained optimization problem of the politician, written below.
where j = D, V refers to the type of the politician. Denote the optimal solution under asymmetric information as
Decent Politician
With probability ρ the politician discovers hard evidence of the bribe and returns the bribe to the consumers so
From the first order conditions, the optimal contracted output for types c L and c H respectively, is given by
L , thus, the decent politician always requires the efficient type to produce the first best output 11 . However, (4.6) and (3.2) are not identical and so in general q
Definition 4
The 'expected' information rent per unit of revenue is defined as
We will denote η as the elasticity of demand for the public output evaluated at q M H , where as before, q M H is the output produced by a private unregulated monopolist. 11 It is easy to check that the omitted IC H constriant is satisfied by the solution. Substituting (4.2) and (4.3) into the IC H constraint one gets ∆c (q H − q L ) ≤ 0, which is true because q H ≤ q L . If expected information rents per unit of revenue are high enough then the politician creates shortages to limit information rents of the efficient type. The relevant comparison of information rents is with the inverse of the elasticity of demand. The intuition is that if elasticity is higher then the sacrifice in consumer surplus associated with shortages is lower. Under asymmetric information, even a decent politician might contract an output that is lower relative to the optimal output produced by an unregulated private monopolist i.e. it is possible that q Although there is no distortion of output for an efficient public-agent in equilibrium, nevertheless, the efficient type is paid a "honesty allowance" or "information rent" in return for her honesty. Bardhan (1997) provides several examples of the empirical relevance of this result. Historically, imperial China used the policy of paying an extra allowance called the "yang-lien yin" (money to nourish honesty) to district magistrates. Robert Clive used a similar policy to reduce corruption in the East India Company. Hong-Kong and Singapore have successfully used incentive payments to reduce corruption; see for instance Klitgaard (1988) and Rose-Ackerman (1999). Although, incentive payments accord more naturally with an agency theoretic explanation, for instance Rose-Ackerman (1999), Mookherji (1997), Mookherji and Png (1995), Besley and McLaren (1993) and Klitgaard (1988) , the essence of the result is unchanged in an adverse selection model. An increase in ∆c or in ν increases expected information rents, which the politician attempts to reduce by creating shortages. Since the affect on the magnitude of bribes depends on whether the contracted output q 
Venal Politician
The venal politician never returns any bribes to the consumers, thus,
(1 + µ −1 ) (from equa-tion (2.8)); substituting in (4.4), the venal politician's unconstrained problem is to choose (q L , q H ) to maximize the following expression
As defined in (3.4), ξ = ρ 2µ
(1 + µ) (1 − µ) < 0, is the venal politician's private marginal cost of a unit of bribes. From the first order conditions, the optimal contracted output for types c L and c H , respectively, is given by:
Comparing (3.7) with (4.8) and (4.9) it follows that q
H . The comparative static properties for a venal politician under full information, stated in Proposition 2, continue to hold for q V L but those for q V H are affected by the presence of the last term in (4.9). The discussion below is organized under three heads.
Shortages and Bribes
Under full information, when the politician is decent, higher-order corruption, in the terminology of Rose-Ackerman (1999) is more crucial, lower-order corruption becomes irrelevant in such a setting (see Proposition 1). However, under asymmetric information, lower-order corruption is relevant, as shown below in Lemma 2 Under asymmetric information, an increase in either ν or in ∆c increases expected information rents. The venal politician responds, just as the decent politician, by contracting the inefficient type to supply an even lower quantity. The effect on bribes, however, depends on whether the contracted output is below (in which case bribes decrease) or above (in which case bribes increase) the monopoly level. If q V H > q M H then an increase in contracted output towards the first best is also accompanied by a reduction in bribes. However, when q V H < q M H a reduction in bribery is accompanied by a movement in output away from the first best; clearly in this case, there is trade-off in reducing bribery.
The tradeoff between bribery and shortages raises interesting welfare issues. For instance it is likely, depending on the parameter values, that an increase in welfare arising from a reduction in bribes overweighs the decrease in welfare arising from increased shortages. Some positive level of corruption can then be welfare enhancing. The existing literature typically ignores the tradeoff between production efficiency and bribery.
Under full information, the venal politician creates greater scarcities and bribes relative to the decent politician and the contracted output, q * H , always lies below that produced by a private unregulated monopolist, q Lemma 3 shows that, unlike the full information case, the venal politician does not necessarily create greater shortages relative to the decent politician. Many forms of public output where scarcity rents have been documented, form an important prerequisite for private investment/ activity in the economy; these include, for instance, industrial licenses, export-import licenses and public credit. Thus, it is plausible to conjecture that scarcities, relative to the first best output, can potentially reduce private investment and by implication, growth; see for instance Mauro (1995 Mauro ( , 1997 . The implication of Lemma 3 in this context is that investment and growth might be greater under the regime of a decent politician when output is high (q M H < q H ), however, at low levels of output (q M H > q H ), it might be higher in the regime of a venal politician.
Auditing Technology
Venal Politician: Several widely advocated anti-corruption measures, documented for instance in Rose-Ackerman (1999), recommend an improvement in the auditing technology in order to reduce the incidence of corruption. However, when the politician is venal, the model predicts that this policy recommendation will be unsuccessful in reducing bribes. Furthermore, there are important, and hitherto unrecognized, implications for production efficiency; these issues are formalized in Proposition 5. An increase in ρ enables the venal politician to detect hard information about bribes more often. Hence, if the venal politician were to distort output to increase bribes, her expected bribes would increase. This increase in the marginal benefit of creating bribes (by distorting the contracted output) over the marginal cost (the distortion in consumer surplus) results in greater output distortions and bribes in equilibrium. Using Remark 1 it is obvious that the equilibrium contracted output moves towards the unregulated monopoly output, q Decent Politician: Recall from (4.5) and (4.6) that the first order conditions for a decent politician are independent of ρ and, hence, the contracted output in this case is independent of an improvement in the monitoring technology. This result can change if taxes are distortionary or there are secrecy costs involved in exchanging bribes.
Consider, for instance, that there are distortionary costs of taxation so that in order to raise a unit of tax revenues, one needs to raise 1 + τ units of tax revenue (τ being the distortionary cost per unit). Check that in this case, the first order condition (4.6) is modified to
Implicitly differentiating (4.10) it can be checked that sign of
The intuition hinges on the choice between two alternative sources of paying the public agent: directly by raising distortionary taxes or indirectly through bribes, so that her individual rationality constraint is satisfied. The marginal benefit of creating bribes (through output distortions) is high if ρ is low so that the expected bribe received by the publicagent, E[B . Exactly the same calculation would then apply to the case of a venal politican. However, Proposition 5 would continue to illustrate the additional influence on contracted output when the politician is venal; one would merely be using a new benchmark to compare the two kinds of politicians. For this reason, we omit further discussion of the distortionary taxation case.
Relation to the literature: The bribe increasing aspect of better auditing technology is similar to Proposition 1 in Laffont and Guessan (1999) who interpret an increase in ρ as an increase in "competitiveness". The interpretation of ρ as competitiveness is best seen by imagining that the responsibility for monitoring the public-agent rests with some auditing supervisors and a proportion ρ are honest. However, unlike Laffont and Guessan (1999) , the intuition here is that when the politician is corrupt, then an increase in ρ reduces the private marginal cost of bribes to the venal politician. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) show empirically that greater distortions, relative to the first best, are associated with weaker auditing technologies (low ρ). However, in Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) the number of public-agents employed by the government (which corresponds to the contracted output) increases following a decrease in ρ. Proposition 5 is able to reconcile these conflicting results; at low levels of output (q H < q M H ) one gets the Tanzi-Davoodi result while at higher levels of output (q H > q M H ) one gets the AcemogluVerdier result. The tradeoff between production efficiency and bribery is again central to this explanation.
Degree of Politician's Venality
Under full information, if the politician is venal, the contracted output is decreasing and bribes are increasing in the degree of venality (or corruptibility) of the politician, µ (see Proposition 2). This section extends that result to asymmetric information. 
The Dynamic Game (Venal Politician)
Suppose now that the politician can offer the public-agent a long-term contract that lasts for two periods. Long-term contracts are generally not renegotiation proof. For instance, the optimal static contracts under asymmetric information,
V repeated over the two periods are not renegotiation-proof because the choice of the first period contract reveals the type of the public-agent. To minimize notation we denote by EV i the expected payoff of a type c i , i = L, H, public-agent when she accepts the contract (q i , t i ). At the beginning of the second period, the politician can offer to renegotiate the contract of the inefficient type by contracting it to produce the first best output q j * H , while maintaining EV H = 0. In the second period, the efficient type will be offered a contract that does not contain any information rents so, EV L = 0. Letting 0 < δ be the discount factor, the intertemporal rent earned by the efficient type is thus q H ∆c + 0 * δ = q H ∆c. However, if the efficient type pools with the inefficient type, the politician does not update beliefs and so, intertemporal rents equal q H ∆c (1 + δ), an improvement of δq H ∆c over the separating equilibrium. Hence, the static contracts are not-renegotiation-proof.
The decent politician is a simpler and special case of a venal politician, hence, the discussion in this section focusses only on the latter.
Description of the Dynamic Game
Suppressing all superscripts and subscripts, write the contract (q, t) as t(q). The "official price" specified in the contract equals c and the feasibility constraint requires p(q) ≥ c. The timing of the contracts is summarized in Figure 5 .1. Based on the prior belief, ν = ν 1 , that the public-agent is of type c L , the politician offers a long-term contract
¢ where t 1 (q 1 ) specifies "first period" transfers conditional on the first period contracted output q 1 and t O 2 (q 1 , q 2 ) is the "null contract" for the "second period", conditional on the first and the second period contracted outputs, q 1 and q 2 . Conditional on the contracts chosen in the first period, the politician updates her prior beliefs, using Bayes rule, at the end of the first period, to ν = ν 2 . In the second period, the politician can offer a new, renegotiated, contract t R 2 (q 1 , q 2 ), to the publicagent. However, given the long-term nature of the original contract, if the new contract is rejected by the public-agent, the politician is committed to implementing the null contract q 2 ) . Since the politician and the public-agent are rational and forward looking, the politician might as well offer a renegotiation-proof contract in the first period itself, in anticipation of future renegotiation.
Characterization of Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
Suppose that the second period rents promised to types c L and c H in the original long-term contract by a politician of type j = D, V are respectively EV jO L and EV jO H ; there is no loss in generality by normalizing EV jO H = 0. In designing the second period contract, conditional on the existence of the null contract, the politician chooses (q L , t L , EV L ) and (q H , t H , EV H ) in order to maximize
subject to the following three constraints
where Z j is as defined in (4.1). Denote the optimal renegotiation-proof contracts for types c L and c H by
H´r espectively; superscript R signifies renegotiation while j = D, V denotes the type of the politician. With the exception of the third constraint, the second period optimization problem is identical to the one considered in Section 4.1, except that the IR H constraint now requires that type c H must not be given lower rents relative to those promised in the null contract. For the renegotiated contract to be attractive to the efficient type, its rents should be no lower relative to those in the null contract; this constitutes the renegotiation-proof constraint, denoted by RP . As in Section 4, the IC H constraint is omitted for the time being; it is easy to check ex-post that it is not violated by the solution. Check that t H enters negatively in the objective function, so the IR H constraint binds, thus
Unlike in Section 4, there is no guarantee that the IC L constraint will bind because of the presence of the RP constraint.
Substituting t H = −Φ (µ, ρ) B H into the objective function, and letting κ 1 and κ 2 be the Lagrangian multipliers on the IC L and the RP constraints, one gets the the following generic problem.
The politician chooses t L , q L , q H and EV L to maximize the Lagrangian expression:
(1 + µ −1 ) (these are defined in (3.4) and (2.8)). In the first instance, differentiate (5.2) with respect to t L and q L only; the first order conditions are
3) into (5.4) evaluated at the optimal renegotiation proof output contracted by the venal politician for the efficient type,
The first order conditions (5.5), (4.8) and (3.7) are identical, hence, the contracted output of the efficient type is not distorted i.e. q
2), the problem reduces to finding q H and EV L to maximize the following Lagrangian expression:
where ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are respectively the Lagrangian multipliers on the IC L and the RP constraints when q
The first order conditions with respect to q H and EV L can be simplified and written as
Since EV 
Lemma 4 : The null contract is renegotiation-proof if q
where q V H (ν 2 ) is the optimal static contract under asymmetric information when ν = ν 2 .
The Optimal Renegotiation-Proof Long-Term Contract
Attention is restricted to a menu of two long-term contracts, X and Y , offered by the politician at the beginning of the game. The output contracted in contract k = X, Y in time period t = 1, 2 is denoted by q k t . The time discount factor is 12 0 < δ. Type c L plays a mixed strategy and accepts contract X with probability π and contract Y with probability 1 − π while type c H accepts contract Y with probability equal to one 13 . The basic structure of the long-term contract is described in Figure 5 .2. Several elements of the optimal contract can be constructed by the following heuristic arguments. Posterior beliefs are updated using Bayes rule. At the upper node, followed by the first period choice of q X 1 the type of the public-agent is revealed to be c L , hence, posterior beliefs specify that ν 2 = 1 and the second period choice of contracted output, q X 2 , is thus optimally equal to the first best i.e. q V * L . At the lower node, followed by the first period choice of q and following this node, the intended contract for the efficient type, denoted by q
When type c L chooses contract Y then, in a renegotiation-proof contract, its total intertemporal information rents equal q
Since type c L randomizes between the two contracts, it must get identical rents from contract X. Furthermore, given that type c L produces the first best allocation in the second period of contract X and must be offered a fixed amount of intertemporal rents, q
, it is also optimal to contract the efficient output in the first period i.e. q 
The RP constraint derives from Lemma 4 and ensures that the solution is renegotiationproof.
Lemma 5 : The optimal contracted output is q 
The first order condition with respect to q Y 1 can be simplified and written as
Denote the solution to q The contracted output is increasing in π because it reduces the expected information rents of the efficient type, hence, reducing the need to create shortages in order to limit such rents. One could compare the long-term contract analyzed above to a series of shortterm (one period) contracts offered to a sequence of public-agents each of whom has private information about costs. Proposition 7 provides some guidelines for such a choice in the presence of corruption. The long-term contract unambiguously dominates the short-term contract in terms of reducing the output distortion ( f q 1 is relatively closer to the first best as compared to q V H ). However, the long-term contract might have relatively lower bribes
In the former case, the long-term contract is unambiguously better in terms of both production efficiency and bribes while in the latter case, the choice between the two contracts depends on society's preferences over efficiency and bribery. It is entirely possible that the cost in terms of greater bribery is found acceptable in return for the benefits of enhanced production efficiency.
In the hybrid equilibrium above, 0 ≤ π ≤ 1; the two polar cases of the fully separating equilibrium (π = 1) and the fully pooling equilibrium (π = 0) are considered below for completeness.
Fully Separating Equilibrium
Substituting π = 1 in (5.9) one gets:
Comparing (5.10) and (4.9) it is obvious that q
Fully Pooling Equilibrium
Substituting π = 0 in (5.9) one gets:
Comparing (5.11) with (4.9) and using ∆c > 0 it is straightforward to show that
Determining the Optimal π
The optimal dynamic contracts have so far been worked out conditional on a given value of π. This subsection examines some properties of the optimal π. Essentially, the politician substitutes the optimal contracts in (5.8) and since the lower limit of the associated constraint binds, maximizes the following expression with respect to π:
¢¤
Noting that f q 1 and q V H depend on π, and using the envelope theorem, the first order condition, upon simplification, can be written as: > 0, thus, a necessary condition for an interior solution to π is that the term in the second braces in (5.12) be positive. Using this information, it is straightforward to check, using the implicit function theorem that ∂π * ∂δ < 0 i.e. the probability of separation of the efficient type is decreasing in the discount factor δ. Proposition 8 below describes how π * responds to δ ∈ (0, ∞); recall that the lengths of the two periods are not necessarily identical so that δ is not bounded above.
Proposition 8 : A sufficient condition for the "fully pooling equilibrium" (π * = 0) to be optimal is that δ → ∞. There exists some critical δ = δ C > 0 such that the "fully separating equilibrium" (π * = 1) is optimal for δ ≤ δ C . The hybrid equilibrium is optimal for intermediate values of δ.
Since the public-agent of type c L is indifferent between the two contracts X and Y , what assurance does one have that the public-agent will randomize according to π * ? A simple interpretation is that when there are a large number of type c L public-agents, a proportion π * are offered the contract X and another proportion 1 − π * are offered the contract Y . A more detailed discussion of the issue using purification theorems falls outside the scope of the paper, see for instance Fudenberg and Tirole (1990).
Conclusions
This paper considers a hierarchical relation between a possibly venal politician and a privately informed public-agent contracted to supply output/ services on behalf of the former to final consumers. The politician contracts the public-agent to supply a certain output at an official price, but the latter can choose to receive a bribe to clear the market i.e. charge a price in excess of the official price. The politician uses a monitoring technology that unearths the incidence of bribery with some positive probability. In the event that the bribe is discovered, a venal politician is willing to hide evidence of the bribe if the public-agent shares the bribes with her. The paper provides information-theoretic microfoundations to this classical problem of scarcity rents. Furthermore, it generates a set of plausible and potentially testable theoretical predictions. In general, the equilibrium is characterized by shortages and bribes. The contracted output can be smaller or greater relative to that produced by a private unregulated monopolist. The paper reconciles apparently conflicting results on the affect of an improvement in the auditing technology on the size of the public sector. An important insight of the paper is that anti-corruption reforms, such as an improvement in the auditing technology, face important trade-offs in enhancing allocative efficiency on the one hand and changes in equilibrium bribes on the other. The size of the public sector can be symptomatic of alternative degrees of corruption. Relative to the static case, in the dynamic renegotiationproof equilibrium, shortages fall but bribes can either increase or decrease. This suggests important determinants of the choice between offering short-term and long-term contracts to public-agents.
Future research can incorporate political institutions and electoral procedures. Political competition among parties could possibly offset some of output distortion that arises on account of corruption. For instance, a party might contest the election on the platform that its candidates have a relatively lower degree of venality, µ, as compared to the opposition. A plausible model along these lines would have to consider a host of contractibility, credibility and coordination issues. Other interesting extensions of the model would be to examine the relationship between corruption and growth, to consider a judicial system that could possibly punish corrupt politicians, and lobbying by consumer groups to influence the contracted output by directly engaging in side transactions with the politician.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 : Check that the net surplus from Nash bargaining, W +V j − d P −d A j , equals x (µ − 1). If the politician is decent (µ ≤ 1) then the net surplus is nonpositive so there are no gains from the corrupt transaction between the politician and the public-agent. Thus, decent politicians (endogenously) refrain from such corrupt deals. Clearly, for a venal politician (µ > 1) there is net positive surplus to be shared between the two parties. Using (2.5) check that (1) . Given that the second order condition requires concavity of the bribe function (and by implication that of Π M ) it follows that q M < q V * i .
Implicitly differentiating (3.7) with respect to ξ:
It can be checked that: The first order condition (7.12) is identical to (4.9), hence, q , then the original contract is renegotiation-proof and the complementary slackness condition implies that ϕ 2 > 0. Using the same reasoning as in Case-I, the first constraint binds and so ϕ 1 > 0. Thus, (5.7) implies that ϕ 1 = ν 2 − ϕ 2 which when substituted into the first order condition (5.6) gives
(ν 2 − ϕ 2 ) (7.13)
Letting the solution to (7.13) be q H = _ q H and comparing (7.12) and (7.13) one gets
. This case is valid till the first constraint just ceases to be binding in which case EV R L > _ q H ∆c and, therefore, ϕ 1 = 0 from the complementary slackness condition. Substituting ϕ 1 = ν 2 − ϕ 2 = 0, one gets:
14)
Comparing to the first order condition under full information (3.7), the solution in this case is q 
